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Abstract 
A small segment of Investor-State Arbitration flows from 
the consequences of resistance by the local population 
(particularly, indigenous people) against the particular 
investment, and the concerned State cancelling permits 
granted earlier, precluding all future activities of the 
investor. This paper seeks to argue that when faced with 
an investment treaty dispute of this nature, arbitrators 
should (and indeed may be required to) reflect on the 
Social License to Operate (SLO) as a part of the applicable 
law. It aims at creating a framework within which the 
Social License to Operate should be conceptualized by 
investment tribunals in the future. The article first 
examines the nature of the social license to operate and 
then goes on to highlight its existence in relevant bodies 
of international law. Thereafter, the article seeks to 
analyze its use in past investment tribunals, such as the 
award laid down in Bear Creek Mining v. Peru, and uses 
this analysis as a springboard to construct a way forward 
for future applications of the concept.   
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Indigenous people, 
International Conventions, Investor-State Arbitration, Investment 
Tribunals 
1. Introduction 
The concept of the Social License to Operate (SLO) has thus far 
been predominantly located in the social sciences, rather than the 
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legal field. Tracing its origins to the circumstances surrounding the 
mining industry, especially owing to the societal pressure exerted 
on the industry due to its adverse environmental and social 
consequences,1 signs of the SLO are now visible across industries 
and even in law, in concepts such as Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). Karin Buhmann argues that the SLO is 
experiencing a ‘juridification’ of sorts, wherein societal expectations 
from businesses are couched in the language of the law, indicating 
cross-fertilization between law and the ethics of business.2 
Therefore, it is imperative that we understand the concept of the 
SLO from a broad perspective, drawing from international finance 
law, environmental law and human rights law.3 The right of the 
affected public (including indigenous people) to participate in 
decision-making processes, the right to free, prior and informed 
consent and sustainable development are avenues in 
conceptualizing the SLO itself. The nature of the SLO in the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,4 
signifies the ‘juridification’ of the field in the intersection of 
business and human rights, whether it be the SLO or CSR. The SLO 
has also been recognized in international investment law, 
evidenced by the rulings of certain investment tribunals, most 
notably in Bear Creek Mining v. Peru,5 which will be examined in 
greater detail.  
                                                          
1 Temple Stoellinger, L.S. Smutko, J.M. Western, Collaboration through 
NEPA: Achieving a Social License to Operate on Federal Public Lands, 39 PUB 
LAND AND RESOURCES LAW REV 203, 210 (2018). 
2 Karin Buhmann, Public Regulators and CSR: The “Social Licence to Operate, 
136 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS 699, 699. 
3 Don Smith, Social License to Operate: Hydraulic Fracturing-Related 
Challenges Facing the Oil & Gas Industry, 1 ONE J 81, 90-93 (2015). 
4 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The 
Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretative Guide. 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR.PUB.12.2_En.p
df 
5 Bear Creek Mining v Peru, ICSID Case ARB/14/21, Award (30 
November 2017)  
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Of particular relevance to investment arbitration is the potential of 
the SLO to mitigate the legitimacy crisis it finds itself mired in6. 
This is primarily owing to the fact that the SLO is determined by 
ideas of democratic participation, societal acceptance and trust. The 
implication of the necessary importance which will have to be 
granted to the SLO is that, arbitrators will not have to consider 
aspects of the SLO as a portion of the law applicable to the 
substance of the dispute. By weaving in the core values of the 
global community and the aspirations and demands of a plethora 
of participants in arbitral awards, arbitrators can catapult the 
international investment mechanism into a new era of social 
legitimacy and approval. The current debate in the field of 
international investment law arises from the tension between the 
requirements of the host State to protect legitimate interests of local 
communities on the one hand, while on the other, simultaneously 
creates an appropriate environment for international investment.7  
2. Examining the Nature of the SLO 
The Minerals Council of Australia defines the SLO as an unwritten 
social contract for which the nature of a license must be earned and 
maintained on grounds of stable performance, backed by the trust 
of the society.8 The absence of an SLO might endanger progress of 
the project, due to protests and shifting of employees to other 
sustainable corporate houses – all this notwithstanding obtaining of 
legal licenses. Similarly, Lindahl defines an SLO as a just balance 
between competing interests of society, ultimately permitting 
certain industrial activities to prosper.9 The SLO limits the area 
within which a company may conduct its activity, since social 
                                                          
6 See generally Thomas Dietz, The legitimacy crisis of investor-state 
arbitration and the new EU investment court system, 26 REV. OF INT'L POL. 
ECON 749 (2019). 
7 MM Barnes, The Social License to Operate: An Emerging Concept in the 
Practice of International Investment Tribunals, 10 JOURNAL OF INT’L 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 328, 328-330 (2019). 
8 MCA, Enduring Value Framework (MINERALS COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA), 
https://minerals.org.au/enduring-value-framework. 
9 Hans Lindahl, One Pillar: Legal Authority and a Social License to Operate in a 
Global Context, 23 IND J GLOBAL LEGAL STUD 201, 210-213 (2016). 
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expectations require companies to restrain themselves from 
activities regarded as undesirable, irrespective of their presence in 
law. The absence of an SLO is usually felt when projects are 
shutdown owing to a fragile socio-political atmosphere, caused in 
turn by manifestations of active dissent, boycotts, protests and 
blockades.10 
Providing an accurate definition of the concept of the SLO is no 
simple task due to the fact that the concept still does not possess a 
stronghold in the legal circuit. This is exacerbated by the fact that 
the process of acquisition and maintenance of an SLO involves a 
spectrum of actors. The essence of the SLO lies in the 
understanding that the stakeholders have the real power and that 
communities have as much authority as governments, in granting 
permissions or licenses.11 In a similar vein, Smits et al.12 posit that in 
order for a particular commercial activity to be performed, a 
company must procure three licenses - a legal license, wherein a 
license located in the regulatory framework of the host State is 
granted by State authorities, in accordance with established 
processes, a political license, where the license of authority is 
granted by the concerned Government to a company to engage in 
the said commercial activity. Finally, a social license, whose 
premise invariably draws from the social contract theory, with the 
implication that even the mightiest States have realized that they 
require something more than just a mere political license to carry 
out a commercial activity that may be problematic for a certain 
segment of their citizenry. The social license is by far the most 
difficult to define of the three-strand SLO model, outlined by Smits 
et al.13   
                                                          
10 Jennifer Howard-Grenville et al, Constructing the License to Operate: 
Internal Factors and Their Influence on Corporate Environmental Decisions, 
30 LAW & POLICY 73, 84 (2008). 
11 R Boutilier, FAQs about the SLO, 32 IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND PROJECT 
APPRAISAL 263, 264–65 (2014). 
12 CA Smits, van Leeuwen & van Tatenhove, Oil and Gas Development in 
Greenland: A SLO, Trust and Legitimacy in Environmental Governance, 53 
RESOURCES POLICY 112, 113 (2017), 
13 Id. 
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The above definitions yield a number of features of the SLO. 
Firstly, since the SLO is an unwritten contract, a visit to a 
Government office and filing of an application cannot help in 
procuring it. Companies require something greater than mere 
money to organically integrate into the societies within which they 
operate.14 The SLO is indeed difficult to obtain, for unlike the legal 
license, there exists no pre-defined checklist which a company must 
fulfill. Yet, not possessing or losing the SLO may have adverse 
impacts on the company, whether in terms of legal sanction, 
financial or reputational loss.15 Consequently, the interaction 
between the three strands of the SLO model cannot be denied. For 
instance, the social license is strengthened by the legal license, since 
the latter provides civil society with the tools to question and 
pressurize companies. On the flipside, the legal license is enlarged 
by the social license, since societal pressure on the legislature often 
culminates in better enactment, increased monitoring and greater 
enforcement of laws. 
The grant and maintenance of the SLO hinges on the company 
obtaining continued acceptance or approval of the local population 
and other relevant stakeholders. Thomson and Boutilier have 
argued that ‘approval’16 (to have favorable regard, agreeing to, or 
being pleased with) of the community satisfies a higher standard 
than mere ‘acceptance’ (tolerate, agree or consent to).  Every effort 
should be taken to widen the range of stakeholders involved in this 
process of acceptance and approval, as certain stakeholders may 
remain marginalized and silent in the beginning and the fulfillment 
of corporate objectives are often limited by relational legacies. 
Additionally, while the community’s acceptance of a particular 
project is non-negotiable, the greater standard of ‘approval’ helps 
legitimize not only the project, but the industry in its entirety. 
Beyond acceptance, at the highest level of the SLO, stakeholders 
                                                          
14 Chilenye Nwapi, Can the Concept of Social Licence to Operate Find Its Way 
into the Formal Legal System, 18 FLINDERS LAW JOURNAL 359, 361-364 
(2016). 
15 Gary Lynch-Wood, The Social License as a Form of Regulation for Small and 
Medium Enterprises, 34 JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY 321, 341 (2007). 
16 Ian Thomson & R Boutilier, Social License to operate, P. Darling ed., 
SME Mining Engineering Handbook, 1779 (2011). 
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may perceive themselves as joint owners of the project. They also 
create a pyramidic model of the SLO, highlighting the various 
stages and boundaries of the SLO.17  
Implicit in the concept of an SLO lies a continuing vetoing 
procedure by the affected community and additional stakeholders. 
In other words, a company’s obligation does not end with 
obtaining the SLO, but extends to maintaining it over the course of 
their activity. Specific to the mining sector, the SLO assumes initial 
relevance during the commencement of explorative activity and 
spans the life-cycle of the mining project, from mine construction to 
operation, to closure and sometimes post closure. Obtaining and 
maintaining the SLO cannot have a fixed formula, for it is context 
specific, varying across distinctive communities with their own 
philosophies.18 For instance in the Bear Creek case19, though there 
were twenty one communities, they had a joint decision-making 
system, and only five (the Huacullani, Ingenio, Chllocolo, Condor 
de Acongua and Ancomarca communities) were consulted. At a 
more general level, plenty of tribes in India such as the Dongria 
Kondh, attribute religious importance to specific areas, and if these 
areas are sought to be brought within the fold of the industrial 
project at a later stage, the SLO would still apply at this stage, and 
consultation is deemed to be a pre-requisite. 
Notwithstanding the SLO’s unwritten, intangible and informal 
content, it can still be enforced legally, since the SLO relies on 
reputation capital. The credibility which comes along with this type 
of capital, reduces the cost of risk linked with acquiring societal 
acceptance, apart from the favor of the government. In order to 
legally enforce the SLO, countries often create an enabling 
framework for projects revolving around community 
consultation.20 For example, India does possess a legislative 
                                                          
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Bear Creek Mining v Peru, ICSID Case ARB/14/21, Award (30 
November 2017) 
20 Claudia Posleman, Social License to Operate in the Mining Industry: The 
Case of Peru, 37 IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND PROJECT APPRAISAL, 480, 485 
(2019). 
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framework on land rights (Right to Fair Compensation and 
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement 
Act, 2013, most notably) and environmental protection laws (the 
Environmental (Protection) Act, 1986 from which companies are 
required to conduct Environmental Impact Assessments, (a 
component of which is consultation of affected people), which 
require companies to consult stakeholders, and thereafter obtain 
environmental clearances and licenses from the state, before 
commencing these operations. However, in India, non-compliance 
with the consultative activity is a common phenomenon. These 
consultative activities constitute a pre-requisite for gaining 
appropriate legal and environmental clearances. Legal sanctions 
aside, the SLO may also be applied from an economic perspective, 
such as the use of consumer boycotts. 
3. Understanding the SLO from the Perspective of 
International Law 
The field of international investment law is not closed and is one 
that requires harmonious interpretation with other provisions of 
international law, of which it is a part. The aim of the article now is 
to facilitate a more nuanced understanding of the SLO. This is done 
by analyzing the decisions of investment tribunals and the use of 
the SLO in their judgements. The SLO is a reflection of continuing 
‘acceptance’ and/or ‘approval’ of a particular corporate project by 
the community and other relevant stakeholders.21 Consequently, 
the principle of public participation shares common ground with 
the SLO. Public participation in turn, includes the right to access 
information, participate in decision-making processes and access 
avenues of justice, with the aim of protecting living conditions and 
limiting environmental harm.22 The right to public participation is 
                                                          
21 Alonso Gurmendi, Indigenous Social License in Investment Projects: A 
Pending Challenge in ISDS (OPINIOJURIS, APRIL 4, 2019), 
opiniojuris.org/2019/04/08/indigenous-social-license-in-investment-
projects-a-pending-challenge-in-isds/. 
22 See generally Lavanya Rajamani & Shibani Ghosh, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
IN INDIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN BARRY BARTON ET AL ED. SHARING 
Christ University Law Journal Vol. 9, No.2                                 ISSN 2278-4322 
found in a number of international environmental instruments, 
from the Aarhus Convention, 199823 to the World Heritage 
Convention, 197224 and the UNECE Convention on Environmental 
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context of 1991.25 
The SLO may also be located within the concept of sustainable 
development, defined broadly as the understanding that the path 
to development must encapsulate the ‘needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs’ (inter and intra generational equity)26. Corporate enterprises 
are now required to respect human rights and the environment, 
given the environmental degradation and cultural disruption 
brought on by their activities.27 While doubts have been cast on the 
status of sustainable development as a rule of customary 
international law, it still forms a part of three hundred international 
conventions.28 Also found in the practice of international courts and 
tribunals, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Gabcikovo-
Nagymoros case29 stated that the goals of economic development 
                                                                                                                                    
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ENERGY AND RESOURCE ACTIVITY: LEGAL 
CHANGE AND IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES (2016). 
23 Convention On Access To Information, Public Participation In Decision-
Making And Access To Justice In Environmental Matters, 25 June 1998, 
https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43
e.pdf 
24 UNESCO, Convention Concerning The Protection Of The World 
Cultural And Natural Heritage, 16 Nov. 1972, 
https://whc.unesco.org/archive/convention-en.pdf 
25 UNECE, Convention On Environmental Impact Assessment In A 
Transboundary Context, 1991, 
https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/eia/documents/legalt
exts/Espoo_Convention_authentic_ENG.pdf 
26 United Nations, Report of the World Commission on Environment and 





29 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, Hungary v Slovakia, Judgment, Merits, 
ICJ GL No 92, (1997) ICJ Rep 7, (1997) ICJ Rep 88, (1998) 37 ILM 162, 
ICGJ 66 (ICJ 1997), 25th September 1997, International Court of Justice. 
Rudresh Mandal                               Analyzing the Social License to Operate 
9 
 
and environmental protection must coalesce, and their duality is 
efficiently captured in the concept of sustainable development. The 
SLO additionally finds resonance in the UN’s Sustainable 
Development Goals, particularly the eighth goal, which fosters 
‘sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth’ and the 
duty of companies in meeting this goal30. The eighth goal 
represents the inclusivity of sustainable development and is a facet 
of the SLO, for any development that negates the voice of affected 
communities cannot be sustainable.  
The responsibility imposed on companies to protect human rights 
as part of their corporate duty, is also enshrined in the United 
Nations Guiding Principles (UNGPs), and M.M. Barnes argues that 
the SLO played a crucial role as part of the discursive process in the 
build-up to promulgation of the UNGPs.31 John Ruggie’s report to 
the Human Rights Council in 200932 also stated that companies 
have now understood that a legal license may not be enough, and 
an SLO is absolutely essential for determining adherence to social 
norms that influence the success of the enterprise.  The SLO also 
echoes in the concept of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), 
one that was extensively discussed in Prof. Sands’ dissent in Bear 
Creek Mining v. Peru33.  At one level, both the right to FPIC and the 
SLO seek to attain the support of communities and stakeholders for 
a particular corporate project. At another level, however, there are 
certain differences between both concepts. The SLO necessitates 
interaction with the community as a whole, and not just indigenous 
people as envisaged by FPIC.34 Further, since international law 
provides the protection of the same to indigenous people, its 
violation or non-compliance attaches itself to the State and not 
                                                          




31 MM Barnes , supra note 7 
32 Id. 
33 Bear Creek Mining v Peru, ICSID Case ARB/14/21, Award (30 
November 2017) 
34 MM Barnes, supra note 32 
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companies, although it may form part of the legal license acquired 
by the company.  
In terms of time, the FPIC is far more limited, for it only applies 
during the pre-project stage and during entry into the land, 
whereas the SLO is an ongoing process of acceptance, which has to 
be maintained over the course of the project.35 The amorphous 
nature of the SLO, therefore, is one which suffers from definitional 
ambiguity, touching upon fields of human rights, environmental 
protection, the right to FPIC and public participation. In fact, the 
composite character of the SLO may result in it forming a part of 
transnational public policy, owing to its nature as a meta-principle, 
used by Boyle and Freestone36, to describe the need for sustainable 
development. Yet, these meta-principles are of significance, for they 
claim normative status as a part of judicial reasoning.  
4. The SLO and its Interface with Investment Treaty Law 
The inclusion of matters concerning sustainable development, 
human rights and its interaction with industrial activity in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs) can broadly be divided into two phases. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), conducted a survey on investment treaty law & 
sustainable development37 in 2014, analyzing 2107 BITs in the 
process. It found that matters of social importance were barely 
mentioned in BITs, prior to 2008. This was primarily because BITs 
create an asymmetrical relationship between the investor company 
and the host State. Investors were traditionally only vested with 
rights, devoid of any corresponding duty/obligation to protect 
                                                          
35 Id. 
36 ALAN BOYLE AND DAVID FREESTONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE 
CHALLENGES, 31–34 (1999). 
37 Gordon, K., J. Pohl and M. Bouchard, Investment Treaty Law, Sustainable 
Development and Responsible Business Conduct: A Fact Finding Survey 
(OECD WORKING PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, 2014) 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jz0xvgx1zlt-en 
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human rights.38 The absence of these matters of sustainable 
development was also felt in the decisions of investment tribunals, 
which were not required to consider them in their reasoning, since 
they were missing from the BITs themselves.  
Gradually however, both scholars and investment tribunals began 
to map the relationship between foreign investment and human 
rights/environmental protection. 75% of the BITs between 2008 
and 2012, and an even greater percentage between 2012 and 2013, 
utilize language revolving around responsible conduct of 
corporations, geared towards securing human rights and 
sustainable development39. The 2018 Model BIT of the Netherlands 
explicitly references soft law instruments, such as the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(UNGP), and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
both of which concern the investors’ duty to protect human rights. 
Article 23 of this BIT goes even further and empowers the arbitral 
tribunal to consider non-compliance with the UNGPs or the OECD 
Guidelines, while determining the quantum of damages40.  
More than the BITs themselves, investment tribunals seeking to 
mitigate the legitimacy crisis plaguing the field, have taken it upon 
themselves to navigate the interface between investment law and 
sustainable development. Steininger41 takes this trend a step 
forward and suggests that sustainable development, human rights 
and responsible business conduct will occupy a pivotal position in 
the debate on the future of investment arbitration. The premise of 
this thought is that, by incorporating the SLO into arbitral awards, 
tribunals change the practice towards ensuring the legitimacy of 
foreign investment and increase their own legitimacy, by 
                                                          
38 Luke Peterson and Kevin Gray, International Human Rights in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and in Investment Treaty Arbitration (IISD, APRIL 2003) 
https:// www.iisd.org/ pdf/2003/ investment_ int_ human_ 
rights_bits.pdf. 
39 Pohl and Bouchard, supra note 37 
40 Art. 23, Netherlands Draft Model BIT, https://globalarbitration 
review.com/digital_assets/820bcdd9-08b5-4bb5-a81e-d69e6c6735ce/ 
Draft-Model-BIT-NL-2018.pdf 
41 Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights, 3 
ICLQ 573, 575-580 (2011). 
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safeguarding the rights of citizens and by elaborating the principles 
of justice beneath their rulings. This strand of thought, along with 
the composite nature of the SLO and its permeation into 
international law, is visible in the Tribunal’s holding in Urbaser v. 
Argentina.42 The Tribunal rejected the Claimant’s assertion that first, 
international investment law did not prescribe any obligation on 
investor companies and second, that international investment law 
was a closed system, and thereby tribunals were precluded from 
using other principles of international law as aids to interpretation. 
The Tribunal specifically referred to the UNGP, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 
conceptualizing the responsibility of companies to safeguard 
human rights. For purposes of the SLO, the importance of this case 
stems predominantly from its holding that international investment 
law is not a closed system, thereby allowing the SLOs 
considerations of sustainable development and human rights to 
integrate with the field of investment law.  
The first case to discuss the SLO extensively was Bear Creek Mining 
v. Republic of Peru.43 While the Tribunal had to consider other 
aspects, such as the acquisition of the mining license in the name of 
a Peruvian employee of Bear Creek, and not Bear Creek itself, in 
order to circumvent the requirement of proving public necessity44 
and the supposed illegality of this mechanism, owing to 
considerations of space and immediate relevance, this paper will 
focus only on the SLO aspects of the Award. In the backdrop to the 
project, Bear Creek obtained the legal license to operate the Santa 
Ana Mining Project through Supreme Decree 083, issued by an 
order passed by the Peruvian Council of Ministers, declaring the 
Project as a public necessity, allowing Bear Creek to enjoy all rights 
arising out of the concession.  
A couple of years into the mining project, wide cracks began to 
emerge in the relationship between Bear Creek and the 
                                                          
42 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur 
Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26 
43 BEAR CREEK, supra note 5. 
44 Id. 
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communities affected by the project. In a severe deterioration of 
their relationship, Bear Creek’s employees were attacked and held 
hostage when they sought to describe the environmental 
management program of the company. The concerns of the local 
communities were that the benefits of the project would not be 
distributed in an equitable fashion between the communities living 
in close proximity of the Santa Ana mine. Responding to this social 
crisis, through a series of community development agreements, 
Bear Creek succeeded in obtaining the acceptance of some of the 
affected communities, but not all. However, owing to rising 
violence and increasing social unrest, the Peruvian Government 
passed Decree 032, which effectively revoked the rights granted to 
Bear Creek under the earlier Decree 083. Consequently, Bear Creek 
brought a claim of damages for indirect expropriation of its 
investment and instituted arbitration proceedings under the Peru-
Canada FTA.  
Peru alleged that the Santa Ana Mining Project lacked an SLO and 
hence Bear Creek directly contributed to the social dissent leading 
to the issuance of Decree 032. The question framed by the Tribunal 
was whether the actions of the Claimant in seeking to obtain a 
Social License were legal, and whether the Claimant was 
attributable to the performance of these acts.45 The majority, in its 
award reiterated that every applicable international instrument 
mandates consultation with affected communities in order to 
obtain their consent, taking into consideration the lack of a 
definition of the SLO in international law and citing the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People.  While for the 
Tribunal it was undeniable that Bear Creek could have undertaken 
greater effort in its community outreach and development 
endeavors, it remained to be seen if greater outreach was legally 
demanded and whether there was a causal link between its absence 
and the social dissent. The majority then based its decision on the 
reasoning that the Government of Peru had, until the outbreak of 
social violence, approved and supported the community outreach 
and consultation efforts, without any objection. Consequently, Bear 
Creek had fulfilled all legal conditions vis-à-vis its community 
                                                          
45 Id. 
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consultation and public participation activities. Given Peru’s 
continued support to Bear Creek’s consultative activities, it was 
now stopped from claiming that the impugned conduct was 
inadequate and caused social unrest in the Santa Ana area.  
The SLO however found greater discussion in Professor Sands’ 
dissenting opinion in Bear Creek. In his opinion, Bear Creek had 
significantly contributed to the unrest, since it had failed to acquire 
and maintain an SLO, and its levels of preparation for investing in 
a land traditionally occupied by a tribal population, were 
insufficient. He went on to extensively refer to Urbaser v Argentina46 
and the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169 
(Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples)47 and noted that 
though Convention 169 did not attach any obligation on private 
foreign investors, the principles contained therein must inform any 
interpretation of the Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 
since the applicable law in the FTA included applicable rules of 
international law. Given Convention 169’s incorporation into 
Peruvian domestic law, it could be considered in determining the 
question of Bear Creek’s discharge of its obligation to engage in 
prior consultation with local tribal communities. In their rejoinder 
to Prof. Sands, the majority highlighted that the reach of ILO 
Convention 169 was limited only to States and not private entities. 
Additionally, the affected tribal communities were not respondents 
in the arbitration, and instead it was the Government of Peru 
whose conduct the Tribunal had to adjudicate on.48 The majority’s 
reasoning exhibits the differences that often arises between the 
interests of the indigenous communities affected by foreign 
investment on the one hand, and the agents of the host State whose 
behavior is subject to the rigors of investment treaty law.49  
                                                          
46 Urbaser, supra note 42 
47 Convention C169—Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 
(No 169). 
48 Bear Creek, dissent, supra note 5. 
49 Joshua Paine, Case Comment on Bear Creek Mining Corporation v. Republic 
of Peru, ICSID REVIEW 1, 2-6 (2018). 
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The definitional ambiguity of the SLO, however, surfaced in the 
majority opinion of Bear Creek50, for they combined the concept of 
the SLO with the FPIC, as mandated by the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and 
ILO Convention 169. The community activities undertaken by Bear 
Creek – the public meetings and workshops, were all pre-requisites 
for obtaining the FPIC, and not the SLO, which as indicated 
previously, is far wider in substantive scope and time than the 
FPIC. For instance, the majority considered it sufficient that Bear 
Creek consulted and held meetings with five of the twenty one 
affected communities, notwithstanding the fact that the affected 
tribe functioned as a collective social unit with a joint decision-
making system. The SLO by its very nature necessitates broad 
approval of a project by the affected community.51 Questions may 
also be raised on whether Bear Creek crossed the legitimacy 
boundary stage of the SLO, since a degree of mistrust with regard 
to its true intentions arose when its Peruvian employee (in whose 
name the mining approval was sought to be granted) did not 
disclose her relationship with the company. Finally, while the 
Majority reasoned that the obligations of international law attach 
themselves to States and not private foreign investors, the State 
cannot be expected to hold the hand of the investor in obtaining the 
SLO. Its duty lies in creating a domestic framework which 
facilitates the implementation of the international obligations of the 
State. From an SLO perspective, the majority reasoning was flawed 
in its usage of the Canada-Peru FTA as an insurance policy 
justifying the lack of preparation by Bear Creek and its inability to 
obtain an SLO.52  
5. Conclusion 
At the outset, it is incumbent on investment tribunals to define the 
SLO and elucidate its components. The majority in Bear Creek 
recognised that the SLO is still not defined in international law, and 
therefore the writing and opinion that exists in the social sciences 
                                                          
50 Bear Creek, supra note 5 
51 Id. 
52 BEAR CREEK, dissent, supra note 5. 
Christ University Law Journal Vol. 9, No.2                                 ISSN 2278-4322 
must be taken as a foundation on which the legal understanding of 
the SLO is constructed. The legal construction of the SLO has 
already begun, with its traces being located in the legal frameworks 
on FPIC, public participation, sustainable development and CSR.53 
Investment tribunals must also seek to ensure that the SLO is not 
confused with similar phenomena like the FPIC, which are limited 
in scope. The majority in Bear Creek blurred the distinction and in 
doing so, reached an end incompatible with the 3-strand model of 
the SLO.54 The consequences of this blurring are significant, for it 
not only hurts the legitimacy of the particular investment, but also 
accentuates the legitimacy of the field of investment law.55  
It is imperative that due attention be paid to the stage the SLO has 
reached. If the foreign investor were to contend with protests and 
dissent from the conceptualization of the project itself (or its initial 
stages), the quantum of damages flowing from expropriation must 
be diminished, in a manner consonant to Prof. Sands’ dissent in 
Bear Creek. Similarly, if the SLO had been obtained initially, but 
could not be maintained through the project, the calculation of 
damages must reflect this.56 The quantum of damages should be 
determined in proportion to the level of SLO that the foreign 
investor has attained. If the legitimacy boundary has been crossed, 
a greater quantum of damages as compensation may flow 
therefrom, and an even higher amount upon crossing the 
credibility boundary. 
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A concept that has thus far evaded the eye of international 
investment tribunals, the SLO has gradually begun to emerge in the 
practice of investment law. Although there exists confusion in the 
manner of approaching or characterizing the SLO, this paper has 
attempted to provide clarity with regards to the legal 
understanding of the SLO. From an Indian perspective, at one level, 
it is crucial that limited concepts like FPIC and sustainable 
development are actually adhered to. SLO is also the manifestation 
of the social responsibility of corporations and the original broader 
philosophy of CSR was to focus on how profits are made, and not 
just complying with CSR expenditure norms. The Indian 
government ought to require investors to think in broader terms of 
the SLO, and it is indeed true that they will have to appropriately 
define the SLO and mandate that this SLO needs to be respected at 
every stage of the project. India’s legislation on land rights, tribal 
rights, forest rights and environmental law as well, contain 
elements of the SLO within itself. This needs to be spelt out as 
constitutive elements of the SLO for progress to be made.  Indeed, 
given the wide range of concepts and laws that the SLO touches 
upon, an exact definition may not be possible, and scholars and 
practitioners alike may have to describe the concept as a composite 
meta-principle belonging to the sphere of transnational public 
policy. The importance of the SLO cannot be over-stated, for it 
enables a meaningful conversation between the often-clashing 
imperatives of investment law and society and in the long run, 
assuages the legitimacy concerns of the field. 
